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During the two periods under consideration the U.S. has
been the number one producer and participant in world trade.
Its economic and economic policy development in general and its
foreign trade policy and development in particular, therefore,
have been of great importance for international trade and for
the economic performance of other countries in both periods. A
slowdown of the U.S. economy, protectionist measures in foreign
trade and monetary protectionism (devaluations) have all
contributed to deteriorations in the export conditions of other
countries, while reverse developments have had beneficial
effects. The objective of this paper is to compare the role
played by the U.S. in causing world-wide boom and bust in the
interwar period with its role in the world economy during the
last: twenty years. Part One presents some data on the weight of
the U.S. in the world economy. Part Two discusses the
development of economic activity in the U.S. and in the world
economy and the link between U.S. import demand and world
trade. Part Three deals with the causes and effects of U.S.
foreign trade policies and of protectionist measures in
particular. Part Four discusses U.S. dollar exchange rate
changes and their effects for world trade developments. Part
Five summarizes the results of the comparison of the interwar
period to the last two decades and tries to explain why another
great depression has not yet occurred.
I. The U.S. Economy in the World Economy
By 1913 the share of the U.S. in world manufacturing
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production had already risen to about 36%. As a consequence of
the First World War and of the prosperity in the 1920s this
share reached 42% in 1926/29. As a result of the long
depression in the U.S. economy it declined to 32% in 1936/38,
but this still constituted by far the dominant proportion of
all national economies. 1
The U.S. was also the leading producer in the world market
for primary products. According to computations by the U.S.
Department of Agriculture, on the basis of data for 1927 and
1928, the U.S. share in the consumption of nine principal raw
materials and foodstuffs amounted to 39 percent of the total
for the 15 most important commercial nations. 2
H.B. Lary in his classic study The United States in the
World Economy also estimated the share of U.S. national income
of the sum of the dollar-denominated national incomes of 24
countries for which such accounts were available, including the
United Kingdom, Germany, France, Japan and Canada. He found
that in 1929 the U.S. national income was as high as the dollar
value of all the other 23 nations taken together. 3
Compared to other economically advanced countries, the
share of foreign trade in GNP has been relatively low in the
U.S. during the twentieth century. War-related demand had
strongly raised the export share during the First World War to
an average of 10.4 percent from 1916 to 1918. But by 1922 it
was back to around 5 percent and remained at about that level
until 1929, while the import share was only 4.2% in both years.
In the great depression these shares fell toa minimum of 2.8%
for exports and 2.3% for imports in 1932 and recovered to only
3.7% for exports and 3.4% for imports in 1937. 4
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Although foreign trade in relation to national income was
relatively low in the U.S., the share of U.S. foreign trade in
world trade was important as a result of the relative size of
the D.S. domestic economy. In 1913 the sum of U.S. exports and
imports amounted to 10.8% of world exports and imports. In 1920
the percentage had risen to 20.8. In 1938 the share was down to
512.1%.
The economic consequences of the Second World War at first
strengthened the dominant position of the U.S. economy in the
world economy, as the First World War had done. In 1950, taking
now into account all the world's countries, the U.S. share in
the world's gross national product (GNP) amounted to almost
40%. Due mainly to the economic reconstruction in Europe and
Japan this share declined to 34% in 1960. As a result of
continental Europe's and, particularly, Japan's continuing
stronger economic advancement it diminished further to around
30 percent in 1970. 6 Excluding the centrally planned economies
th e U. S. shar e in total worl d GNP in 1970 amounte d t 0 39%.
Mainly due to the statistical effect of the dollar exchange
rate changes, it diminished sharply in the 1970s to 30% in 1975
and further to 26% in 1980, but by 1983 it had recovered 33%.7
The share of U.S. foreign trade in world trade (exports
and imports) showed a similar pattern of development into the
1960s. It declined ·from 15.3% in 1950 to 13.5% in 1960 and
further to 12.6% in 1965. From then on it remained around that
level and was still 12.8% in 1983. 8
During the last twenty years several important structural
changes have occurred:
- in the share of foreign trade in national income
- in the trade balance situation
3
- in the cornposition of foreign trade.
In 1965 U.S. merchandise exports amounted to 4.0% of GNP,
imports to only 3.1%. In 1970 these percentages were 4.4 for
exports and 4.1 for imports. 9 In the 1970s they rose
considerably to 8.5% for exports and 9.5% for imports in 1980.
In 1984 the percentages stood at 6.0 for exports and 8.9 for
imports. 10
The U.S. trade balance had always shown a surplus since
1893 and swung into deficit for the first time in 1971. A
surplus reappeared in the recession year 1975 (9 billion
dollars). From 1976 to 1982 deficits of mostly between 30 and
40 billion dollars annually were recorded. ll When U.S. economic
recovery since 1982 and a strong dollar boosted import demand,
U.S. trade deficits grew to 61 billion dollars in 1983, 107
billion dollars in 198412 and an estimated 150 billion dollars
in 1985. 'Ihe 1 ag ging of export growth behind import growth was
d ue to two factors, among others. First, U.S. multinational
companies have been expanding their production abroad as a
substitute for American exports and have relied more and more
on parts produced abroad and imported as inputs for domestic
production. 13 Secondly, the oil price increase in the 1970s was
mainly responsible for an increase in the share of raw material
imports in total U.S. imports. From its 1970 level of 16.4% it
roughly doubled to 31.5% in 1974 and 33.4% in 1975. The second
oil price shock at the end of the seventies increased this
percentage even further to 38.4 in 1980. Since then it has been
going down to 26.4% in 1983. 14




The link through which the v.s. transmitted impulses to
world economic activity was its import demand. The growth rates
of v.s. imports and those of world exports in real terms are
therefore also presented in Table l. Again we find stronger
fluctuations in the V.S. rates than in the world rates. Both
time series fluctuate more strongly than the GDP growth rates,
but in correlation with them. One line of causation for the
impulses the V.S. economy transmitted to economic activity in
other parts of the world, what we might call the income effect,
ran from changes in the growth rate of real GDP in the V.S. to
changes in V. S. import demand and thus to changes in exports
and therefore in growth rates of real GDP in other countries.
As the weight of the V.S. economy in the world economy was
even greater in the interwar period, the impact of U.S.
economic developments on economic activity in other parts of
the world was at least as important then. ·The data comparable
to those of the last twenty years are presented in Table 2.
Data on the growth rates of GNP in the V.S. are presented in
column (1). GNP growth rates in the world as a whole are not
available for this period. Instead, the growth rates of world
manufacturing production are presented. They generally tend to
fluctuate more than the growth rates of GNP. Therefore, the
variance of columns (1) in Table 2 is not much different from
that of column (2). Actually, however, economic activity in·the
V.S. fluctuated more strongly than in the world as a whole, as
c ould be shown by a comparison of manufacturing production in
the world with that in the V.S. alone, 16 and as it is evidenced
by comparing the developemnt of U. S. imports and world exports
i
in col umns (3) and (4) of Tabl e 2. Th is again indicates t hat
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restraint agreements and non-tariff barriers (NTBs) started
spreading rapidly, as did subsidies to national industries that
would otherwise have been priced out of the market. Yet, they
do not seem to have matched the trade impeding effects of high-
tariff (and unilateral import quota) measures of the interwar
period. As recent U.S. developments have clearly shown there
have been many more protectionist demands than measures. 19 But
these calls for protection are considered to bepotentially
more dangerous obstacles to a rapid development of
international trade and of national economic growth which would
result from the most efficient allocation of production
resources on an international scale. The danger is caused by
the broad spectrum of possible instruments, such as buy
national campaigns and procurement practices of governments,
safety and health standards for imports designed to disguise
protectionist motives and procrastination with customs clearing
procedures. 20 In contrast to tariff increases, these measures
tend to be discriminatory among trading partners. 21 The
principle of non-discrimination that made for the success of
the GATT is therefore eroded.
The new protectionism has been mainly applied to specific
industries, especially textiles, clothing, shoes, steel,
it has been applied to imports such as





machine tools, electronics ~d
shoes, textiles and clothing from NICs. (newly industrialized
countries). The new protectionism is, however, a world-wide
phenomenon. 23
NTBs were not unknown in the interwar period. They spread
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especially in the 19305,24 when unilateral import quotas and
regulation of foreign trade through foreign exchange controls
proliferated. Bilateralism and trade discrimination were the
result. But all through the 19305 and during the previous
decade high tariffs were in force in addition, whereas during
the last 20 years tariffs have been low and were even lowered
further, e.g. in the Tokio round of the GATT in 1979, while the
new protectionism was expanding." Free trade remained the
guiding principle of policy makers, even when they committed
the sin of protectionism. The Reagan Administration especially
has been carrying the free trade banner, even while it has
pressured other countries into export restraint or has
consented to import restrietions.
This was different in the interwar period. The Republican
Party was a strong p"artisan of "the protective tariff". 25 After
it had recaptured a majority in Congress at the end of World
War land returned to the Wh i te House in 1921, i t reversed the
tariff reductions that President Wilson had enacted in 1913.
The traditionally protective· tariff from the Civil War to
Wilson was interpreted by the Republicans as the cause 0 f high
economic 9 rowth in t he U. S. in that period . Trade
discrimination, not high tariffs, was the concern of the
Republicans. The result was the Fordney-McCumber Act of 1922:
non-discriminatory, but instead of opening the door to the
American market for foreign competitors, it closed it for
everybody alike. The average rate of duty on dutiable U.S.
imports that had been 27% under the Underwood-Simmons tariffs
from 1913-20 climbed to 38.5% from 1922-30. Under the Smoot-
Hawley Act of 1930 it even went up further, to 53%.26
.
That average rates as high as this impeded exports to the
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U.S. is evidenced by the fact that U.S. imports in the 1920s
grew less than world exports and that they shrank much more
than world exports in the depression years 1930-32 (cp. Table
~). Only after the Roosevelt Administration had the Reciprocal
Trade Agreement Act passed in 1934 and Secretary of State
CordeIl Hull had initiated a round of trade agreements lowering
tariffs27 did U.S. imports grow rapidly from 1935-37 (cp. Table
~), before recession struck again in 1938.
Were O.S. trade policy measures, namely the trade acts of
the interwar period, a cause or consequence of economic crisis?
When the Republicans started their protective legislation with
the Emergency. Tariff Act of 1921 that preceded the Fordney-
McCumber Act of 1922, the O.S. and the world economies already
found themselves in the midst of the first postwar depression.
The tariff measures do not seem to have aggravated it in the
U.S., as recovery was rapid and led into the boom of the 1920s.
U.S. imports grew by almost 30% in 1922 (Table ~). But
afterwards the new U.S. tariffs hampered the growth of American
imports, thus prevented the U.S. boom from fully spilling over
abroad and
developments
contributed to the unsatisfactory economic
in Europe and in other parts of the world, where
relative stagnation - as in Great Britain and Germany
prevailed in the 1920s. 28
Proponents of supply-side economics in the U.S. have
recently advanced the hypothesis that the discussions of the
Smoot-Ha wley Bill in Congress caused the great crash on the New
York stock exchange in October 1929 that is generally seen as
the beginning of the Great Depression. 29 But there was a
depression on world agricultural markets throughout the second
10
half of the 1920s and this had prompted President Hoover to
initiate the Smoot-Hawley revisions. Finally, the o.s. 1938
recession had not been preceded by protectionist measures, but
by trade liberalizing agreements. There is therefore no proof
that protectionist measures caused depression. 30
But the Smoot-Hawley Act of 1930 seems to have done much
to aggravate it. It started a vicious circle of protectionism
around the world31 that diminished the international division
of labor in the 1930s, promoted policies of autarky and was
therefore self-defeating for the O.S., which finally emerged
fra m th e economic doldrums only after th e Secon d Worl d War
started.
In addition to O.S. trade policy action, the kind of D.S.
tariffs (and of tariffs elsewhere) aggravated the crisis.
Tariff rates had traditionally been set as specific (fixed
dollar amount per unit of imported products), not as ad-valorem
(percent rate on the value of imported products) tariffs. This
remained unchanged for the most part during the interwar
period. The effect was that even with unchanged tariff rates
the relative rate of protection increased with a decline of
prices. As D.S. import prices fell to about half from 1929 to
1933 32, an automatie increase in the relative rate of
protection occurred for those imported goods for which there
was a specific tariff rate. Th e above-mentioned rise in t he
average rate of duty under the Smoot-Hawley Act was therefore
not only the result of increased tariff rates, but of the
decline of prices as weIl. In other words, relative protection
would have increased even in the absence of new tariff
legislatio n. Specifi c tarif f rate s tende d t 0 liberalize
international trade automatically when prices went up in boom
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situations and to impede it when prices fell in depression.
Thi s shoul d have reduced the demand for tar if f increases in
recession, but a Republican Gbngress and President nevertheless
acte d twic e to meet further protectionist demand s. On e must
conclude that it was less a need for protectionist action that
prompted such tariff legislation, but more the ideology of non-
discriminatory protectionism that the Republican politicians
adhered to. 33 This is confirmed by the fact that a Democratic
majori ty in Congress passed the Collie r Tarif f Bill in 1932
at the depth of the depression - providing for substantially
lower tariffs immediately, for reciprocal trade agreements, and
for an international conference on trade (it was vetoed by
Hoover) 34 and that the Re osevel t ld ministration embarked u pon
the Trade Agreement Program in 1934 when recovery was still
barely visible. 35
While the Republican tariff increases of 1921/22 and 1930
canno t be regarded as causes of th e depression, thei"r size
might weIl have been a consequence of the economic crisis. In
both instances the log-rolling process by which politicians in
Congress were induced to agreeto more and more protectionist
demands 36 indicates that such demands increase and that the
political market is more receptive to them under crisis
conditions. 37 Q1ly after the Smoot-Hawley policy had been
discredited by the world's as yet greatest economic depression
and the Republicans favorable to protectionism had lost their
power base to the traditional party of free trade, did the
tides turn and protectionist forces in the U.S. no longer meet
wi t h compliant poli ticians, al though crisis condi tion s still
p ersisted. A different crisis remedy could now be tried on the
12
patient.
The wave of new protectionism since the 1970s has less to
do with changes in government. There seems to be agreement that
the weakness of economic growth contributed to its spreading. 38
The international division of labor connected with
international trade requires constant structural adjustments of
national economies to changes in international competitive
positions. Capital and labor displaced by foreign competition
is more easily absorbed in a growing than in a stagncting
economy. While the breakdown of the international monetary
system with massive exchange rate changes 39 and the two oil
price shocks seem to have contributed to economic stagnation,
they have by the same token increased the need for economic
adjustmen t. ~th less employment opportunities for capital and
labor the increased need for adjustment meets wi th r esistance,
no t only on the part of labor unions that have develope d into
t he most protectionist force in the U. S. in: recent years. Th e
owner s of threatened industries also fight for protectio n in
order to avoid the necessary adjustment under unfavorable
economi c condi tion s. lhde r such circumstance s th e cleavage
between export- and import-dependent industries on the one hand
and irnport-threatened industries on the other becomes more
i mportant for trade policy demands than the traditional
cleavage between capital owners and labor.
The forces of the new protectionism have applied pressure
most visibly in the U.S. Congress. Their demands have been
satisfied to some degree, but most of them have not yet found
political approval. The banner of free trade is still being
used, especially by the Reagan Administration, to ward off the
worst attacks on the liberal trading system that had been the
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basis for so many years of prosperity in the 1950s and 1960s.
Conservative policy now means to preserve the chances for
survival of the non-discriminatory liberal trading system.
Conservative politicians in Washington, mainly Republicans,
behave accordingly at present, while their liberal
counterparts, mainly Democrats supported by labor unions, have
more and more adopted the protectionist ideology, obviously as
a consequence of recent crisis experience. Future economic
growth or stagnation will be a decisive factor in settling the
issue.
IV. D.S. Dollar Exchange Rate Changes and World Trade
The fixed exchange rate system with free capital movements
that had been reestablished after the First World Kar mainly
with the stabilization of the'German mark in 1923/24, the
return to prewar parity of the British pound in 1925 and the
de-facto stabilization of the French franc in 1926, broke down
as a consequence of the great depression. 40 Some countries
followed the example of Great Britain in 1931 and let their
currencies float and devalue. Other countries, like Germany in
1931, while keeping the exchange rate, introduced exchange
controls, thus ending the freedom of capital movements. Germany
pursued a ruthless policy of deflation into 1932 in order to
achieve areal effective exchange rate depreciation of the mark
without changing its nominal parity. The D.S. dollar still tied
to its gold parity was faced with an effective exchange rate
appreciation41 that further depressed prices in the D.S. In
order to alleviate the price situation the new Roosevelt
Administration in early 1933 took the dollar off gold, let it
float and depreciate on the foreign exchange markets and
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introduced a new gold parity in February 1934 {35 dollars per
ounce of gold as against 20.67 dollars effective until 1933).42
This depreciation of the dollar was meant to be a price support
measure. It was not necessitated by balance-of-payments
reasons, as the British and other devaluations had been. As a
measure of monetary protectionism on top of U.S. trade
protectionism it added to the difficulties of other countries
to export to the U.S. and compete with the U.S. in third
markets. It made the earning, by countries indebted to the U.S.
in Europe and elsewhere, of dollars for the servicing of their
debts even more difficult than it had been since capital
exports of the U.S. had dried up from 1928 on.
When the Nixon Administration cut the link between the
dollar and gold in August 1971, the dollarls trade-weighted
exchange rate depreciated by about 8.5% in the next half year.
A furt her depreciation of about 9 percent occurred from January
to March 1973, when the fixed-exchange rate system was finally
abandoned. 43 This h~ppened before the oil price shock of 1974
led the world economy into its first serious postwar
depression. In contrast to the great depression in the inter-
war period, the U.S. did not practice monetary protectionism in
this period of crisis. In fact, when the Democratic Carter
Administration took office in January 1977, the effective
foreign exchange value of the dollar was about 5% higher than
it had been in March 1973. Under Carter's presidency, however,
there was a strong depreciation of the dollar by altogether
about 20% from January 1977 to September 1 980. 44 This was
mainly caused by rising inflation rates in the U.S. reaching a
record 13.5% on consumer prices in 1980. Again, this "monetary
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protectionism" of the U.5. occurred before the U.5. and the
world economy started sliding into another depression in 1980
(cp. Table 1). As a result of the adoption of antiinflationary
policies via money supply targeting by the Federal Reserve
Board in late 1979, U.5. interest rates rose and reached
unprecedented levels. This and Ronald Reagan's election into
the White House attracted international capital into the U.5.
forcing the value of the dollar to appreciate. The trade-
weighted dollar exchange rate has been rising every year in
depression until the second half of 1982 and while a strong
recovery was under way in 1983 and even more so in 1984. When
it reached its maximum in February 1985, it was slightly more
than 80% higher than the average of 1980 (Table ~). Enormously
growing U.5. foreign trade deficits during the economic
recovery since 1982 have resulted from this development. The
opposite of monetary protectionism, the appreciation of the
dollar in the last five years, greatly strengthened the
spillover effects from U.8. economic recovery to world economic
activity. It helped to avoid a vicious circle of beggar-thy-
neighbor policies on the foreign exchange markets. It
attenuated the economic consequences, especially on
unemployment, of restrictive fiscal and monetary policies
conducted outside the U.8. in order to reduce . public sector
deficits and inflation. It certainly contributed to increasing
demands for trade protectionism in the U.8., but it also
compensated foreign exporters for facing new trade restrictions
in the U.8.
The price paid by the U.8. for its leadersip role in the
world economy in the last few years was among others the 10ss
of its international net creditor position it has held since
16
the First World War. It has given up its international wealth
to finance recovery for itself with the described spillover
effects abroad. That the world's leading industrial country
should remain an international net debtor is unlikely.
Therefore, sooner or later U.S. current account surpluses will
have to reappear. If the swing should occur in the absence of
dynamic growth abroad, it would aggravate the problem of
stagnation, as it would have to be produced by falling U.S.
imports. But if instead it can be brought about by rising U.S.
export into a booming world economy, the adjustment will be
easier. Especially the West German and Japanese economies will
have to absorb much higher and growing imports and will have to
accept current account deficits to make room for U.S. current
account surpluses.
v. The Relevance of the Interwar Experience for the
Contemporary World
The world economy as yet has not experienced adepression
of equal dimension as the one in the interwar period. The
problem of relatively low growth rates since the 1970s has not
been aggravated by a collapse of world prices that marked the
way into the great depression. With exchange rates floating,
national currencies could be, and were, manipulated. This
facilitated the absorption 9f the first oil price shock of 1974
by a combination of economic stagnation and higher inflatio~ in
the oil-importing countries. A vicious deflationary spiral that
characterized the period from 1929 to 1932 was avoided.
But the fate of the world economy has recently been
similarly dependent on the performance of the U.S. economy as
it was in the interwar period. As long as the international
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exchange in trade and capital is not curtailed drastically
among market economies, a scenario in which the world's biggest
national economy is stagnating or even in depression, while the
other countries are developing normally, is unthinkable.
Some problems of the interwar period have thus far not
reappeared in threatening dimensions. In spite of some "new
protectionism", nothing like the interwar trade and monetary
protectionism is in sight. The break-up of the world economy
into preferential zones, as was typical for the 19305, has not
and is not likely to occur. Occasional instances of dirty
floating apart, "monetary protectionism" by purposeful
undervaluations of currencies was not practiced in the recent
period.
The lesson of the interwar experience most relevant for
I _ the contemporary problems of the world economy derives from the
fact that the u.s. dollar, these days even more than during the
interwar years, occupies the center stage in international
transactions. In 1943 HaI B. Lary already drew the conclusions:
"Although various salutary lessons are to be drawn
from our experience during the years extending from
the end of the first World War to the beginning of
the second, the conclusion that emerges most
emphatically from the foregoing survey is the
fundamental importance of maintaining a more stable
and ample flow of dollars in transactions with other
countries. Two main sources of instability and
disturbance in the international dealings of the
United States stand out: (1) The extraordinary
amplitude of fluctuations in domestic economic life,
with concomitant variations in our purchases of
foreign goods and services; and (2) the erratic
behavior of capital movements." 4 :>
Lary rearranged U.S. balance of payment statistics to show
items supplying dollars to foreign countries, namely all out-
payments on current account (imports etc.) and the gross
outflow of long-term capital. The data are presented in Table
1 8
4 .
The data show that each depression of the interwar period
(1921, 1929-1933, 1938) was accompanied by severe reductions in
dollars supplied by the o.s. to foreign countries. Lary
explains the severity of the great depression mainly by the
huge reduction in the dollar supply of 68 percent from 1929 to
1932. 46 Not only o.s. foreign investments, but also o.s.
imports fell sharply in that period. As the world economy had
been accustomed to a high and mostly growing supply of dollars
in the 1920s, it was faced with a tremendous readjustment
problem that found expression in the deflationary spiral of.
world trade and that the newly established fixed exchange rate
system with freedom of capital movements did not survive.
The fixed exchange rate system of the post-World-War-II
period came under strain at the end of the 1960s and in the
early 1970s and was finally given up in March 1973 not because
there was an undersupply of o.s. dollars in the world, but
rather because there was an oversupply (cp. Table~) that had
produced inflationary pressures all over the world. O.S. gross
capital outflows increased dramatically over the rest of the
1970s and further until 1982 (Table 5). This was the period
when credits flowed to third world countries on a large scale,
credits that led to the third-world debt crisis of recent
years. In 1983 and 1984, in contrast, O.S. gross capital
exports fell sharply, while the O.S. economy underwent one of
its most rapid recoveries. The supply of dollars abroad by O.S.
imports has also grown throughout the 1970s (with the exception
of 1975) and in 1980 and 1981, although less than capital
exports, and, starting in 1983, again dramatically in 1984
1 9
(Table ~) .
In contrast to the interwar period, the supply of U.S.
dollars to foreign countries in the last twenty years has been
growing substantially almost every year, as a comparison of
column (3) in Tables 4 and 5 shows. But as in the interwar
period, a falling supply coincided with world economic crises
in 1975 and in 1982/83. Variation in U.S. import activity
generally seems to have been of greater importance than
variation in capital outflows (with 1983 being an exception,
when the negative change in capital outflows was greater than
the positive change in U.S. imports). Domestic stabilization of
economic growth in the U.S., therefore, seems to be of crucial
importance for stabilizing world economic developments. The
strong economic recovery in the D.S. in 1983 and especially in
1984 and the concomitant huge increase in U.S. imports and thus
in the supply of dollars to foreign countries certainly
contributed to sparing the world adepression experience
similar to that of the interwar period. Imports were able to
play this role, because, in striking contrast to the interwar
period, the U.S. Government has kept protectionist forces
largely under control - inspite of some "new protectionism" in
trade - and has welcomed and tolerated a substantial
appreciation of the dollar,
protectionism".
i. e. the opposi te of "monetary
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Table 1: Growth Fa tes of Gr oss D,)mestic Pr oduct and of Foreign
Trade 1965-84 in Percent
Gross Domestic Product (real) Foreign Trade (real)
u.S. World U.S. Imports World Exports
( 1 ) (2 ) ( 3 ) ( 4 )
1965 6.0 5.7 13.6 6.8
66 6 .1 5.3 1 6.5 7.5
67 2. 7 3. 6 4.0 4.8
68 4.6 5.3 22.1 1 2.4
69 2.8 5.4 5.8 11.0
70 -0.2 3.4 3.2 9.8
71 3.3 4.0 8.6 6.2
72 5.6 5.4 13.5 8.5
73 5.5 6 . 1 4.7 1 3. 1
74 -0.8 1.9 -1. 5 6.4
75 -0.9 0.5 -1 1. 9 -5.3
76 5.3 5 .2 21.7 1 1 . 7
77 5.5 4.3 10. 8 4.3
78 4.9 3.9 1 0.2 4.5
79 2.4 3. 7 0.2 6.3
80
-0.3 2.0 -7 .1 0.5
81 2.6 1 .8 2.5 -1 .2
82 -2.0 0.0 -5.0 -2.5
83 3.8 1 . 9 7.5 2.5
84 6.8 27.0 9.0
Sourees:
(1) and (2): IMF, International Financial Statistics. Yearbook
1984, Washington, DC 1984, pp.120-121.
(3) and (4) 1965-1981: IMF, International Financial Statistics.
Supplement on Trade Statistics. Supplement Series No.4, Washing-
ton, DC 1982, pp.142-145. 1982-1984 for U.S. imports: Survey of
Current Business, various years; for world exports: Bank for
International Settlements, Annual Report, various years.
25
Table 3: Trade-Weighted Foreign Exchange Value of the U.S .
. , Dollar 1967-1985; March 1973 = 100
1967 1 20.0 1977 1 03.3
68 122.1 78 92.4
69 1 22.4 79 88.1
70 121 .1 80 87.4
71 1 17.8 81 1 02. 9
72 109 .1 82 11 6 .6
73 99.1 83 1 25.3
74 101 .4 84 138.2
75 98.5 Febr. 85 1 58.4
76 105.6
Source and Method:
11 Index of the Weighted-Average Exchange Value of the U. S. Dol-
lar: Revision", in Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve




Table 4: Annual Supply of U.S. Dollars to Foreign Countries via
I , Payments by the U. S. on Current Account and by Long-






Total, (1) + (2)
1 919 9631 719 10350
20 7715 141 3 9128
21 3976 877 4853
22 4382 949 5331
23 5082 485 5567






























































HaI B. Lary, The United States in the World Economy. The Inter-
national Transactions of the United States During the Interwar
Period, Washington, DC 1943, p.216, Table 11.
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Table 5: Annual Supply of D.S. Dollars to Foreign Countries via
Payments by the D.S. for Imports of Goods and Services
and for Gross Capital Outflows 1965-1984 (in Billions
of Dollars)
Imports of Goods Capital Outflow (Gross)
and Services = Increase in D.S.
Assets Abroad










































































1 1 4 • 4
1 73.5
163.6
202.7
228.5
290.4
343.4
418.7
471 .1
469.5
414.6
474.0
Sources:
1965-1974:
1975-1984:
Survey
Issue,
Ibid. ,
of Current Business,
p.30-31.
current.
29
Vol.55 (1975), June
